Posts Tagged ‘United States’


There is no federal protection for women workers who are pregnant. Such as Angelica Valencia [ht: sm], who was fired after she requested permission from her employer not to be forced to work overtime.

The United States did pass The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which prohibits discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” But the Act does not require employers to do anything to accommodate the needs of pregnant workers (although the Supreme Court is set to hear a case, Young v. United Parcel Service, on “whether, and in what circumstances, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. . .requires an employer that provides work accommodations to non-pregnant employees with work limitations to provide work accommodations to pregnant employees who are ‘similar in their ability or inability to work'”).  And the Pregnant Women’s Fairness Act, H.R. 1975 and S. 942 [pdf], which was referred to Committee on 14 May 14 2013, has no chance of being enacted anytime soon.

So, seventeen separate states and cities, such Illinois and New York City, have had to pass their own legislative protections. Still, many workers don’t know their rights, and often don’t have the means to demand compliance. And their employers often disregard the laws that do exist.

Respecting a woman’s pregnancy at work is also a social and racial equity issue. According to the National Women’s Law Center, low-wage women workers, many of them primary income-earners, often have more physically demanding duties, such as lifting boxes or prolonged standing. Pregnancy-related discrimination complaints have been concentrated in the highly gendered service sectors, like retail sales and hospitality. Many physically strenuous jobs like domestic work and home healthcare services are disproportionately done by immigrant and black women.

A female executive of the Lean In class probably wouldn’t be reprimanded for wanting to lean back a bit with a foot rest at board meetings. But women workers at Walmart had to wage a national campaign for months before the company changed its policies to ensure reasonable pregnancy accommodations (and many say the policy remains only spottily enforced).


There’s good news. And bad news.

The good: Angela Valencia’s bosses [ht: sm] have offered her job back. The bad: the United States still doesn’t have a Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (see original post).


Special mention

r620-642d4f50419684559ee0648bc6f7b96a 154926_600




The other day, I reported that Fed chair Janet Yellen said a great deal about existing levels of economic inequality at the Conference on Economic Opportunity and Inequality in Boston.

Neil Irwin [ht: ra] reminds us there’s a great deal Yellen didn’t say. She didn’t, for example, say anything about the aspects of the inequality puzzle that have a close tie-in to the policies of the Federal Reserve.

there is a growing body of evidence — far from proven, but certainly gaining traction — that income inequality could be a significant force behind disappointing overall economic growth over the last 15 years.

The story goes like this: The wealthy tend to save a large proportion of their income, whereas middle and lower-income people spend almost all of what they earn. Because a rising share of income is going to the wealthy, spending — and hence aggregate demand — is rising more slowly than it would if there were more even distribution of income. Skyrocketing debt levels papered over this disconnect in the mid-2000s, but now we could be feeling its effect.

If true, this would help account for why the economy has notched mediocre growth since the turn of the century, with the exception being a brief period of the housing bubble.

Yellen also didn’t have anything to say about the economic opportunities that have allowed the gains of a tiny minority at the top to be captured in the first place. Top 1 percent incomes and corporate profits have to come from somewhere. They’re created during the course of producing goods and services—in the United States and around the world. But the workers who did all that producing only get to keep part of the value they create, in the form of wages and salaries; the rest—call it the surplus—is appropriated by their employers, who keep some in the form of corporate profits and then distribute the rest to their owners and top managers. Those employers, owners, and managers spend some of that income and plow the rest into the ownership of various forms of wealth. It’s no wonder, then, that—given the economic opportunities they’ve been provided within current economic arrangements—the distribution of both income and wealth has been getting more and more unequal.

That’s what Janet Yellen didn’t say.


Once again, as in 2010, a specter is haunting the United States—the specter of deflation.

That’s certainly the fear registered by Jon Hilsenrath and Brian Blackstone, writing for the Wall Street Journal.

Behind the spate of market turmoil lurks a worry that top policy makers thought they had beaten back a few years ago: the specter of deflation.

A general fall in consumer prices emerged as a big concern after the 2008 financial crisis because it summoned memories of deep and lingering downturns like the Great Depression and two decades of lost growth in Japan. The world’s central banks in recent years have used a variety of easy-money policies to fight its debilitating effects.

Now, fresh signs of slow global economic growth, falling commodities prices, sagging stock markets and declining bond yields suggest the deflation risk hasn’t gone away, particularly in the often-frenetic eyes of investors. These emerging threats come as the Federal Reserve is on track this month to end a bond-buying program that has been one of the main tools in its fight against falling prices.

The deflation concern is particularly pronounced in Europe and Japan, two economies where policy makers are struggling to come up with solutions to counter especially slow economic growth.

Actually, what we’re seeing right now is disinflation, a slowing of the rate of price increases. But the fear is that disinflation may collapse into deflation, a Japan-style decline in the overall level of prices, in Europe and eventually in the United States.

And why is it a specter? Not because a decrease in prices hurts ordinary workers—who, of course, facing stagnant wages and bad job prospects, would welcome some relief from inflation. No, the fear is that deflation will cut into corporate profits, since it’s a symptom of extremely weak demand. This leads to a slowdown in economic activity and less production and investment by companies. It’s also a sign that the real value of the debt overhang—especially the private debt of households and businesses—will remain high, thus undermining any further increase in lending, and reinforcing the uneven and faltering rate of growth of production and investment.

Thus far, the specter of deflation has not caused all the powers of old United States and Europe to enter into a holy alliance to exorcise this specter. There are still too many antigovernment, inflation-fear-mongers out there for such an alliance to form. But the longer those powers continue on their current trajectory, the higher the risk the current recovery will collapse into deflation.


The growing gap between a tiny minority at the top and everyone else is now so obvious even the Federal Reserve chair, Janet Yellen, has openly recognized it as a problem.

The distribution of income and wealth in the United States has been widening more or less steadily for several decades, to a greater extent than in most advanced countries. This trend paused during the Great Recession because of larger wealth losses for those at the top of the distribution and because increased safety-net spending helped offset some income losses for those below the top. But widening inequality resumed in the recovery, as the stock market rebounded, wage growth and the healing of the labor market have been slow, and the increase in home prices has not fully restored the housing wealth lost by the large majority of households for which it is their primary asset.

The extent of and continuing increase in inequality in the United States greatly concern me. The past several decades have seen the most sustained rise in inequality since the 19th century after more than 40 years of narrowing inequality following the Great Depression. By some estimates, income and wealth inequality are near their highest levels in the past hundred years, much higher than the average during that time span and probably higher than for much of American history before then. It is no secret that the past few decades of widening inequality can be summed up as significant income and wealth gains for those at the very top and stagnant living standards for the majority.

r > g

Posted: 16 October 2014 in Uncategorized
Tags: , , , ,


No, the so-called expert opinion reported in the survey by the University of Chicago’s Initiative on Global Markets does not invalidate Thomas Piketty’s claim that r > g (that is, the rate of return on wealth being greater than the growth rate of output) is “the most powerful force pushing towards greater wealth inequality” in the United States.


As Jordan Weissmann explains, that was never Piketty’s claim in the first place:

I found myself wondering: How would Piketty himself weigh in?

“Well,” he told me in an email this morning, “I think the book makes pretty clear that the powerful force behind rising income and wealth inequality in the US since the 1970s is the rise of the inequality of labor earnings, itself due to a mixture of rising inequality in access to skills and higher education, and of exploding top managerial compensation (itself probably stimulated by large cuts in top tax rates), So this indeed has little to do with r>g.”

Let’s put it a different way: when more surplus is being pumped out of the direct producers, which is then distributed to a tiny minority at the top of the distribution of income, we can expect to see rising inequality in the distribution of income. Then, when that tiny minority that has managed to capture and keep a large portion of the surplus uses some portion of their income to purchase assets, as against the rest of the population that barely gets by on their wages and salaries, we can expect to see a more and more unequal distribution of wealth.

I can only imagine what the so-called experts would opine about that explanation. . .


This chart contains some of the data on economic inequality from the report of a recent conference organized by the Washington Center for Equitable Growth.

From Emmanuel Saez:

In the United States today, the share of total pre-tax income accruing to the top 1 percent has more than doubled over the past five decades. The wealthy among us (families with incomes above $400,000) pulled in 22 percent of pre-tax income in 2012, the last year for which complete data are available, compared to less than 10 percent in the 1970s. What’s more, by 2012 the top 1 percent income earners had regained almost all the ground lost during the Great Recession of 2007-2009. In contrast, the remaining 99 percent experienced stagnated real income growth—after factoring in inflation—after the Great Recession.

Another less documented but equally alarming trend has been the surge in wealth inequality in the United States since the 1970s. In a new working paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, Gabriel Zucman at the London School of Economics and I examined information on capital income from individual tax return data to construct measures of U.S. wealth concentration since 1913. We find that the share of total household wealth accrued by the top 1 percent of families— those with wealth of more than $4 million in 2012—increased to almost 42 percent in 2012 from less than 25 percent in the late 1970s. Almost all of this increase is due to gains among the top 0 .1 percent of families with wealth of more than $20 million in 2012. The wealth of these families surged to 22 percent of total household wealth in the United States in 2012 from around 7.5 percent in the late 1970s.

The flip side of such rising wealth concentration is the stagnation in middle-class wealth. Although average wealth per family grew by about 60 percent between 1986 and 2012, the average wealth of families in the bottom 90 percent essentially stagnated. In particu­lar, the Great Recession reduced their average family wealth to $85,000 in 2009 from $130,000 in 2006. By 2012, average family wealth for the bottom 90 percent was still only $83,000. In contrast, wealth among the top 1 percent increased substantially over the same period, regaining most of the wealth lost during the Great Recession.

For both wealth and income, then, there is a very uneven recovery from the losses of the Great Recession, with almost no gains for the bottom 90 percent, and all the gains concentrated among the top 10 percent, and especially the top 1 percent.