Even as the overwhelming evidence is U.S. corporate taxes have been decreasing and workers’ wages have also been falling (both, in the chart at top of the post, as a percentage of gross domestic income), there are still those who try to convince us corporate taxes should be lowered still further—and workers are the ones who will benefit.
I know. It goes against all logic (and, as it turns out, the empirical evidence). But, according to Kevin Hassett and Aparna Mathur of the American Enterprise Institute, lowering corporate taxes is the only real cure for wage stagnation among American workers.
They’re right about wage stagnation (although they miss the declining share of national income going to workers). But lowering corporate taxes is not going to solve that problem. Raising workers’ wages will.
I wrote above that it was against all logic. Actually, it is consistent with the logic of neoclassical economics, which goes as follows: capital moves to or stays in lower tax zones (states or countries), which boosts the productivity of workers (who are not as mobile), which in turn leads to higher wages (since the presumption is workers are paid according to their productivity). And, on the reverse side, if corporate taxes go up (as some, like me, have argued they should), corporations will shift the burden of the tax to workers, who will then be paid less.
The holes in the logic are, to use the current vernacular, HUUGE. Where corporations decide to realize their profits may shift according to tax rates but that doesn’t mean capital itself moves to those zones. Even if capital moves, it can often replace workers (or leading to the hiring of other, lower-waged workers). And, even if workers become more productive, they’re not necessarily paid more.
And then there’s the evidence—or lack thereof. As Kimberly Clausing explains, “a review of the prior empirical work in this area fails to reveal persuasive empirical evidence of adverse effects on labor.” And that’s because of globalization itself:
First, if corporations are mere intermediaries in global capital markets in which a wide assortment of investors with different tax treatments invest, tax policy changes could affect the ownership and financing patterns of assets more than they affect the aggregate level of investment in different countries. Second, since multinational firms have become increasingly adept at separating the reporting of income from the true location of the underlying economic activities, international tax avoidance itself comes with a silver lining. Mobile firms move profits without needing to substantially alter the underlying investments, whereas immobile firms do not respond like the open-economy actors of modern corporate tax incidence models. In both cases, workers in high-tax countries are relatively insulated from adverse wage effects due to capital reallocation toward low-tax countries.
So, if the logic is faulty and the empirical evidence questionable, what’s left? Merely one more attempt to lower the tax burden on corporations—and thus put private profits even more out of the reach of public claims on those profits.