Posts Tagged ‘acquisitions’



Back in 2010, Charles Ferguson, the director of Inside Job, exposed the failure of prominent mainstream economists who wrote about and spoke on matters of economic policy to disclose their conflicts of interest in the lead-up to the crash of 2007-08. Reuters followed up by publishing a special report on the lack of a clear standard of disclosure for economists and other academics who testified before the Senate Banking Committee and the House Financial Services Committee between late 2008 and early 2010, as lawmakers debated the biggest overhaul of financial regulation since the 1930s.

Well, economists are still at it, leveraging their academic prestige with secret reports justifying corporate concentration.

That’s according to a new report from ProPublica:

If the government ends up approving the $85 billion AT&T-Time Warner merger, credit won’t necessarily belong to the executives, bankers, lawyers, and lobbyists pushing for the deal. More likely, it will be due to the professors.

A serial acquirer, AT&T must persuade the government to allow every major deal. Again and again, the company has relied on economists from America’s top universities to make its case before the Justice Department or the Federal Trade Commission. Moonlighting for a consulting firm named Compass Lexecon, they represented AT&T when it bought Centennial, DirecTV, and Leap Wireless; and when it tried unsuccessfully to absorb T-Mobile. And now AT&T and Time Warner have hired three top Compass Lexecon economists to counter criticism that the giant deal would harm consumers and concentrate too much media power in one company.

Today, “in front of the government, in many cases the most important advocate is the economist and lawyers come second,” said James Denvir, an antitrust lawyer at Boies, Schiller.

Economists who specialize in antitrust — affiliated with Chicago, Harvard, Princeton, the University of California, Berkeley, and other prestigious universities — reshaped their field through scholarly work showing that mergers create efficiencies of scale that benefit consumers. But they reap their most lucrative paydays by lending their academic authority to mergers their corporate clients propose. Corporate lawyers hire them from Compass Lexecon and half a dozen other firms to sway the government by documenting that a merger won’t be “anti-competitive”: in other words, that it won’t raise retail prices, stifle innovation, or restrict product offerings. Their optimistic forecasts, though, often turn out to be wrong, and the mergers they champion may be hurting the economy.

Right now, the United States is experiencing a wave of corporate mergers and acquisitions, leading to increasing levels of concentration, reminiscent of the first Gilded Age. And, according to ProPublica, a small number of hired guns from economics—who routinely move through the revolving door between government and corporate consulting—have written reports for and testified in favor of dozens of takeovers involving AT&T and many of the country’s other major corporations.

Looking forward, the appointment of Republican former U.S. Federal Trade Commission member Joshua Wright to lead Donald Trump’s transition team that is focused on the Federal Trade Commission may signal even more mergers in the years ahead. Earlier this month Wright expressed his view that

Economists have long rejected the “antitrust by the numbers” approach. Indeed, the quiet consensus among antitrust economists in academia and within the two antitrust agencies is that mergers between competitors do not often lead to market power but do often generate significant benefits for consumers — lower prices and higher quality. Sometimes mergers harm consumers, but those instances are relatively rare.

Because the economic case for a drastic change in merger policy is so weak, the new critics argue more antitrust enforcement is good for political reasons. Big companies have more political power, they say, so more antitrust can reduce this power disparity. Big companies can pay lower wages, so we should allow fewer big firms to merge to protect the working man. And big firms make more money, so using antitrust to prevent firms from becoming big will reduce income inequality too. Whatever the merits of these various policy goals, antitrust is an exceptionally poor tool to use to achieve them. Instead of allowing consumers to decide companies’ fates, courts and regulators decided them based on squishy assessments of impossible things to measure, like accumulated political power. The result was that antitrust became a tool to prevent firms from engaging in behavior that benefited consumers in the marketplace.

And, no doubt, there will be plenty of mainstream economists who will be willing, for large payouts, to present the models that justify a new wave of corporate mergers and acquisitions in the years ahead.

hospital mergers


Much of the debate about the U.S. healthcare system is focused on the role of public financing (in terms of subsidies and, for some, the possibility of a public option or even a single-payer program). But no one seems to want to look at the other key part, the actual delivery of healthcare to American workers and others. And that, regardless of the system of financing, remains mostly in profit-oriented private hands (which, as I argued earlier this year, undermines patient-centered healthcare).

There are a few exceptions, such as the Veterans Health Administration and Indian Health Service, whereby the government directly employs nurses, physicians, and others to provide health services to targeted populations. But the rest of healthcare is provided by private  (profit and nominally nonprofit) individuals, groups, and corporations.

As I discussed on Friday, a significant sector of private healthcare is the increasingly concentrated and enormously profitable pharmaceutical industry. Hospitals (which I’ve commented on many times over the years) are, of course, another key sector (at close to $1 trillion in 2014). That’s where Americans receive most of their in-patient care, critical care (including many without health insurance in emergency rooms), and an increasing number of out-patient treatments. And while hospitals appear to be independent from and non-overlapping with physicians (whose services accounted for roughly $600 billion in 2014), that’s an optical illusion. Not only do they compete with one another (in surgery, imaging, and other ambulatory services), each is forced to work closely with the other: hospitals rely on physicians to admit patients to their facilities, refer to their specialists, and to use their lucrative diagnostic services (with, as it turns out, illegal kickbacks), while physicians tend to their own patients within hospitals and are contracted for “in-house” supervision. And, increasingly, hospitals are directly employing physicians (and other healthcare workers) as salaried and piece-rate workers.


U.S. hospitals are, as it turns out, remarkably profitable. And, according to a recent analysis by Ge Bai and Gerard F. Anderson (unfortunately gated), 7 of the 10 of the most profitable hospitals (each exceeding more than $163 million in total profits from patient care services) are officially non-profit institutions.

According to Anderson,

The system is broken when nonprofit hospitals are raking in such high profits. The most profitable hospitals should either lower their prices or put those profits into other services within the community. We need to develop incentives that allow all hospitals to make a fair profit while at the same time keeping prices reasonable.

It’s true, many other hospitals (56 percent in their sample of acute-care facilities) are not profitable strictly in terms of patient services (the median hospital lost $82 per adjusted patient discharge). However, as the authors explain,

the median overall net income from all activities per adjusted discharge was a profit of $353, because many hospitals earned substantial profits from nonoperating activities—primarily from investments, charitable contributions (in the case of nonprofit hospitals), tuition (in the case of teaching hospitals), parking fees, and space rental. It appears that nonoperating activities allowed many hospitals that were unprofitable on the basis of operating activities to become profitable overall.

The most important factors boosting hospital profitability were markups (especially for uninsured and out-of-network patients and casualty and workers’ compensation insurers who often pay the hospital’s full charge) and the combination of system affiliation and regional power.

In fact, 50 hospitals in the United States are charging uninsured consumers more than 10 times the actual cost of patient care. All but one of the facilities are owned by for-profit entities. Topping the list is North Okaloosa Medical Center, a 110-bed facility in the Florida Panhandle about an hour outside of Pensacola, where uninsured patients are charged 12.6 times the actual cost of patient care. Community Health Systems operates 25 of the hospitals on the list. Hospital Corporation of America operates 14 others.

Again according to Anderson:

They are price-gouging because they can. They are marking up the prices because no one is telling them they can’t. These are the hospitals that have the highest markup of all 5,000 hospitals in the United States. This means when it costs the hospital $100, they are going to charge you, on average, $1,000.




It should come as no surprise, then, that, while the total number of hospitals has remained relatively constant over time, the number of those hospitals in health systems has continued to increase, thereby increasing regional power, markups, and profitability.

In another recent study, by Richard M. Scheffler et al., the authors found that the hospital markets in two states (California and New York) “were moderately to highly concentrated,” with mean Herfindahl-Hirschman indices of 2,259 and 3,708, respectively.* They also found that more concentrated hospital markets were associated with higher premium growth.

As expected, then, there is a continuing strong movement of hospital mergers and acquisitions—with at least 100 deals covering 178 hospitals, involving the takeover of profit and especially non-profit organizations, in 2014—leading to increased concentration in the hospital sector of the U.S. healthcare industry.

As Martin Gaynor explains,

There has been so much consolidation that most urban areas in the US are now dominated by one to three large hospital systems — examples include Boston (Partners), the Bay Area (Sutter), Pittsburgh (UPMC), and Cleveland (Cleveland Clinic, University Hospital). It is also now more likely that further consolidation will combine close competitors, given how many mergers have already occurred.

Clearly, the provision of healthcare through U.S. hospitals—both profit and, at least officially, non-profit—is generating enormous profits for their owners and top executives. But it’s Americans workers, who are both hospital employees and consumers of hospital services, who are paying the price.


*To remind readers, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is often used to evaluate the potential antitrust implications of acquisitions and mergers across many industries, including health care. It is calculated by summing the squares of the market shares of individual firms. Markets are then classified in one of three categories: (1) nonconcentrated, with an index below 1,500; (2) moderately concentrated, with an index between 1,500 and 2,500; and (3) highly concentrated, with an index above 2,500.

David Simonds cartoon showing oil firms preparing for mergers

Special mention

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