Posts Tagged ‘chart’

income-distribution-usa-cities

Yesterday, I discussed new findings concerning the fact that, while the United States is getting richer every year, American workers are not.

That same problem is showing up in American cities, which since 1970 have experienced a “hollowing-out” of the middle-class.

The graphic above shows the change in income distribution in 20 major U.S. cities between 1970 and 2015. In 1970, each of these cities exhibits a near-symmetrical, bell-shaped income distribution—a high concentration of households in the middle, with narrow tails of low and high-income households on either end. By 2015, the distributions have grown more polarized: fewer middle-income households, and more households in the low-income and/or high-income extremes.

1970 2015

Chicago is a good example of what has taken place in urban areas across the country. It boasted a thriving manufacturing sector in 1970. As illustrated in the map on the left above, incomes were lowest in the city center, growing higher radially outward toward the city’s borders. And while Chicago was largely successful in transitioning away from manufacturing to a service-based economy by 2015, that transition created a heavy concentration of wealth in the business/financial district and marked decline in most of the surrounding areas (as indicated in the map on the right).

To listen to the champions of American capitalism, cities represent the solution to growing inequality and the decline of the middle-class associated with the “old” manufacturing economy. But, as it turns out, urban centers are characterized by the same kind of grotesque inequalities and hollowing-out of the middle-class as the rest of the country.

incomedata-0503-men

That’s the way Fatih Guvenen, an economist at the University of Minnesota and one of the authors of a new paper on the decline of the American middle class, characterizes the results of their study.

What the authors found is, first, comparing the cohort that entered the labor market in 1967 to the cohort that entered in 1983, median lifetime income of men declined by 10–19 percent. Thus, for example, in terms of real earnings (deflated by the personal consumption expenditure), the annualized value of median lifetime wage/salary income for male workers declined by $4,400 per year from the 1957 cohort to the 1983 cohort, or $136,400 over the 31-year working period.

For women, median lifetime income increased by 22–33 percent from the 1967 to the 1983 cohort, but these gains were relative to very low lifetime income for the earliest cohort.

Second, they found that inequality in lifetime incomes has increased significantly within each gender group, which is largely attributed to an increase in inequality at young ages. Thus, for example, the median income at age 25 has declined steadily from the 1967 cohort to the 1983 cohort. Moreover, median incomes over the first 10 years in the labor market for more recent cohorts (those that turned 25 in the 2000s) indicate that the trend of declining median lifetime incomes seems likely to continue.

What the results show is that more unequal incomes are not primarily a result of a widening gap between younger and older workers. Even among older workers, typical incomes have been falling while the richest have been enjoying more and more of the economy’s gains. Poorer workers—who tend to be younger—will likely earn more as they get older but they are not going to earn enough to make up the difference.

Yes, indeed, this is a pretty bleak picture.

CEOs

According to the AFL-CIO Executive Paywatch project, in 2016, CEOs of S&P 500 Index companies received, on average, $13.1 million in total compensation. In contrast, production and nonsupervisory workers earned only $37,632, on average, in 2016—a CEO-to-worker pay ratio of 347 to 1.

Above is a list of the top twenty CEOs, ranging from Kenneth Lowe of Scripps Networks Interactive at over $28 million to Sundar Pichai of Alphabet, who managed to capture over $100 million in executive compensation.

Greg Kahn

I am quite willing to admit that, based on last Friday’s job report, the Second Great Depression is now over.

As regular readers know, I have been using the analogy to the Great Depression of the 1930s to characterize the situation in the United States since late 2007. Then as now, it was not a recession but, instead, a depression.

As I explain to my students in A Tale of Two Depressions, the National Bureau of Economic Research doesn’t have any official criteria for distinguishing an economic depression from a recession. What I offer them as an alternative are two criteria: (a) being down (as against going down) and (b) the normal rules are suspended (as, e.g., in the case of the “zero lower bound” and the election of Donald Trump).

By those criteria, the United States experienced a second Great Depression starting in December 2007 and continuing through April 2017. That’s almost a decade of being down and suspending the normal rules!

Now, with the official unemployment rate having fallen to 4.4 percent, equal to the low it had reached in May 2007, we can safely say the Second Great Depression has come to an end.

However, that doesn’t mean we’re out of the woods, or that we can forget about the effects of the most recent depression on American workers.*

GDP.jpg

For example, while Gross Domestic Product per capita in the United States is higher now than it was at the end of 2007 ($51,860 versus $49,586, in chained 2009 dollars, or 4.6 percent), it is still much lower than it would have been had the previous trend continued (which can be seen in the chart above, where I extend the 2000-2007 trend line forward to 2017). All that lost output—not to mention the accompanying jobs, homes, communities, and so on—represents one of the lingering effects of the Second Great Depression.

HS  college

And we can’t forget that young workers face elevated rates of underemployment—11.9 percent for young college graduates and much higher, 30.9 percent, for young high-school graduates. As the Economic Policy Institute observes,

This suggests that young graduates face less desirable employment options than they used to in response to the recent labor market weakness for young workers.

income  wealth

Finally, the previous trend of growing inequality—in terms of both income and wealth—has continued during the Second Great Depression. And there are no indications from the economy or economic policy that suggest that trend will be reversed anytime soon.

So, here we are at the end of the Second Great Depression—no longer down and with the normal rules back in place—and yet the effects from the longest and most severe downturn since the 1930s will be felt for generations to come.

 

*As if often the case, readers’ comments on newspaper articles tell a different story from the articles themselves. Here are two, on the New York Times article about the latest employment data:

John Schmidt—

Any discussion about “full employment”, when there are so many people who’ve essentially given up looking for work or who’re working in low-skill or unskilled labor positions, seems like the fiscal equivalent of rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Based on data from the Fed and the World Bank, GDP per capita has doubled since 1993, while median household income has risen ~10%. Most of the newly-generated wealth and gains from productivity increases are being funneled upward, such that the average worker very rarely sees any sort of pay increase. Are we expected to believe that this will change now that we’ve [arguably] passed some arbitrary threshold? Why should we pat ourselves on the back for reaching “full employment”? Shouldn’t we be seeking *fulfilling* employment for everyone, instead, at least inasmuch as that’s possible? Shouldn’t we care that the relentless drive for profit at the expense of everything else is creating a toxic environment where the only way to ensure a raise is to hop from job to job, eroding any sense of two-way loyalty between companies and their employees?

I’m not sure what the solution is, but I know enough to see there’s a problem. Inequality of this sort is not sustainable, and it’s not going to magically disappear without some serious policy changes.

David Dennis—

There is a critical parameter missing from full employment data. very critical. Here in Pontiac, Michigan before the collapse of American manufacturing, full employment meant 10, 000 jobs working at GM factories and Pontiac Motors making above the mean wages with excellent health insurance as well as retirement pensions. You can not compare full employment at McDonalds and Walmart with the jobs that preceded them. The full employment measure doesn’t mean much if it isn’t correlated with a index that compares that employment with a standard of living as it relates to a set basket of goods, services, and benefits.

4ac

Skellington is right: in my post on Tuesday, I did not separate out people at the very top from the rest of those at the top. That’s because, in the data I presented, those in the top 0.1 percent were included in the top 1 percent.

Unfortunately, I don’t have the same kind of breakdown in the composition of incomes as I used in those charts. What I do have are data on the shares of income and wealth for the top 0.1 percent versus the remainder of the top 1 percent (so, top 1 percent to but not including the top 0. 1 percent).

Income

Clearly, income within the top 1 percent is unequally distributed—and has gotten more unequal over time. While the top 0.1 percent (approximately 326.5 thousand individuals) captured about 9.3 of pre-tax income in 2014 (up from 3.9 percent in 1979), the remainder of the top 1 percent (and thus about 2.9 million individuals) took home about 10.9 percent of pre-tax income in 2014 (up from 7.3 percent in 1979). Over time (from 1979 to 2014), the top 0.1 percent has increased its share of the income going to the top 1 percent from a bit more than a third (35 percent) to almost half (46 percent).

wealth

The distribution of wealth within the top 1 percent is even more unequally distributed than the distribution of income—and it, too, has become more unequal over time. While the top 0.1 percent owned about 19.1 percent of total household wealth in 2014 (up from 7.2 percent in 1979), the remainder of the top 1 percent owned about 18. 2 percent of household wealth in 2014 (up from 15.2 percent in 1979). Thus, over time, the top 0.1 percent has increased its share of household wealth owned by the top 1 percent from about one third (32 percent) to over half (51.3 percent).

The conclusions, then, are straightforward: For decades now, those at the top have managed to pull away—in terms of both income and wealth—from everyone else in the United States. And, by the same token, those at the very top have been distancing themselves from everyone else at the top.

No matter how much they do battle over their respective shares, the one thing that ties together those at the top and those at the very top is that their income and accumulated wealth derive from the surplus created by the bottom 90 percent.

fredgraph

The latest jobs report by the Bureau of Labor Statistics has the official unemployment rate declining by two percentage points, to 4.5 percent, in March.

And yet, as is clear from the chart above, workers’ wages (average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers) are barely keeping ahead of inflation (measured by the Consumer Price Index, less food and energy).

Workers are still waiting for their share of the current recovery.

countries

This semester, we’re teaching A Tale of Two Depressions, a course designed as a comparison of the first and second Great Depressions in the United States. And one of the themes of the course is that, in considering the conditions and consequences of the two depressions, we’re talking about a tale of two countries.

As it turns out, the tale of two countries may be even more true in the case of the most recent crises of capitalism. That’s because the two countries were growing apart in the decades leading up to the crash—and the gap has continued growing afterward.

It seems we learned even less than we thought about the first Great Depression. Or maybe those at the top learned even more.

As Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman remind us,

Because the pre-tax incomes of the bottom 50% stagnated while average national income per adult grew, the share of national income earned by the bottom 50% collapsed from 20% in 1980 to 12.5% in 2014. Over the same period, the share of incomes going to the top 1% surged from 10.7% in 1980 to 20.2% in 2014.

What is clear from the data illustrated in the chart at the top of the post, these two income groups basically switched their income shares, with about 8 points of national income transferred from the bottom 50 percent to the top 1 percent.

groups

The consequence is that the bottom half of the income distribution in the United States has been completely shut off from economic growth since the 1970s. From 1980 to 2014, average national income per adult grew by 61 percent in the United States, yet the average pre-tax income of the bottom 50 percent of individual income earners stagnated at about $16,000 per adult after adjusting for inflation, which barely registers on the chart above. In contrast, income skyrocketed at the top of the income distribution, rising 205 percent for the top 1%, 321 percent for the top 0.01%, and 636 percent for the top 0.001%.

Clearly, “an economy that fails to deliver growth for half of its people for an entire generation”—and, I would add, distributes the growth that has occurred to a tiny group at the top—”is bound to generate discontent with the status quo and a rejection of establishment politics.”