Posts Tagged ‘Marx’

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From the very beginning, one of the central claims on behalf of capitalism has been that it leads to increases in productivity—and, as a result, an increase in the wealth of nations. The idea is that, the more national wealth increases (the more commodities are produced per person hour worked), the higher living standards of ordinary people will be (i.e., real wages will increase).* We find that story in pretty much every text of mainstream economics, from Adam Smith to Deirdre McCloskey.

That’s why Karl Marx spent so much time (hundreds of pages, in fact) discussing productivity (along with machinery, mechanization, technical change, and so forth) in his critique of political economy. So, John Cassidy gets it wrong.

Marx (not to mention other nineteenth-century critics of capitalism) never denied that there was a connection between increases in productivity and a rise in workers’ wages. That would be silly, both theoretically and empirically. All he ever did was deny there’s an automatic or necessary relationship between them—and, perhaps more important, that increases in real wages didn’t mean workers weren’t being increasingly exploited.

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The first point (one even Cassidy, in a way, concedes) is easy to show: for a time (until 1973 or so, in the United States), workers’ real wages increased at roughly the same rate as productivity. Then (from 1973 onward), productivity continued to grow but workers’ wages stagnated.

One key question, for the pre-1973 period, is why productivity and workers’ real wages increased in tandem. Cassidy assumes that wages grew because of the increases in productivity. Nothing could be further from the truth. The explanation for the increases in productivity (having to do with the growth of manufacturing, capitalist competition, the role of U.S. corporations in the world economy, and so on) is separate from the change in wages (based on fast economic growth, unionization, a shortage of labor power, and so on). There’s simply no automatic relationship between increases in productivity and increases in real wages, which has been confirmed by their divergence after 1973.

The second point is, in my view, even more important. It’s possible for workers’ wages to increase (at or even above the rate of growth of productivity) and for capitalist exploitation to also be rising.

Let me explain. In Marxian theory, the rate of exploitation (s/v) is the ratio of surplus-value (s) to the value of labor power (v). The value of labor power is, in turn, equal to the exchange-value per unit use-value (e), or price, of the commodities in the wage bundle (q), or the real wage. So, we have v = e*q and, in terms of rates of change, Δv/v = Δe/e + Δq/q. Mathematically, exploitation can increase (Marx referred to it as relative surplus-value) if the value of labor power is decreasing (Δv/v is negative) even if real wages are going up (Δq/q is positive) as along as the change in the price of wage commodities is negative (Δe/e) and its absolute value is greater than the change in real wages (|Δe/e| > |Δq/q|).

For example, in terms of numbers: if real wages increase by 10 percent (workers are buying more things) but the prices of the items in the wage bundle (food, clothing, shelter) decrease by 20 percent, then the value of labor power (what capitalists have to pay to get access to the commodity labor power) will decrease by 10 percent. Voilà! Higher real wages can be (and, throughout much of the history of U.S. capitalism, have been) accompanied by rising exploitation.

And that’s precisely one of the effects of increasing productivity: it lowers the exchange-value per unit use-value of wage commodities.** Less labor is embodied in each unit of bread, shirts, and housing. The fact that workers are able to purchase more of those commodities (say, at the same rate as productivity is increasing) doesn’t mean exploitation is not also increasing.

That’s even more the case when real wages are stagnant (Δq/q is equal to zero). Then, the decline in the price of wage goods (again,  decreasing by 20 percent) is translated directly into an increase in exploitation (via a 20 percent decrease in v).

But what if rate of growth of domestic productivity begins to decline (as it did after 1973, and even more so in recent years)? Then, the domestic contribution to the decline in the price of wage commodities would fall (say, to 10 percent). But, at the same time, if jobs are offshored and cheaper wage goods are imported from abroad (think Walmart), that also leads to a decline in the price of wage goods (say, by another 10 percent). So, even with declining domestic productivity growth, the combination of domestic production and imported goods can lead to a decline in the price of wage goods (for a total, as before, of 20 percent) that, with constant real wages, decreases the value of labor power (by 20 percent) and increases the rate of exploitation.

So, while Cassidy and many others are worried about a slowdown in productivity growth (linking it to workers’ wages and living standards), workers know that increases in productivity don’t automatically lead to increases in real wages. And even if real wages do rise, it’s still likely they’ll be more exploited than before.

Their employers, not they, will be ones to benefit.

 

*It is merely presumed that the standard of living of those at the top, the capitalists and other members of the 1 percent, would be just fine.

**Another, separate issue is why productivity itself might increase. The Marxian argument is that, during the course of competing over “super-profits,” that is distributions of the surplus-value among and between capitalist enterprises, capitalists will engage in technical change, which in turn leads to increases in productivity and a decline in the value of the commodities they produce. An interesting question, then, is why productivity in the United States and other advanced countries has slowed down. One reason may be a decline in competitive pressures among enterprises that produce goods and services.

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I’ll admit, I’m a real sucker for any argument that takes a common sense, turns it on its head, and finds a radically different potential.

That, of course, is what Karl Marx did with classical political economy.

The idea is that what Marx was doing—and what Marxists after him need to do—is less the application of a particularly Marxian method (whatever it is called) and more the two-fold critique of mainstream economic thought and of capitalism, the economic and social system celebrated by classical political economists.

Let me push that idea a bit further: the starting point of Capital consists in the taken-for-granted assumptions of both classical political economy and of bourgeois society and then to develop a “ruthless criticism of all that exists, ruthless both in the sense of not being afraid of the results it arrives at and in the sense of being just as little afraid of conflict with the powers that be.” It begins by accepting the rules of both mainstream economic thought and of capitalism and then calling them into question. . .

And it’s what all utopian (and dystopian) writers and thinkers do: they take the existing society and show how it can be radically different—leading to a better (or, sometimes, worse) “no-place.”

So, I was immediately drawn to Jason Goldfarb’s [ht: ja] assessment of the radical potential of Pokémon GO.

Yes, that much derided (in the mainstream press and in popular leftist publications alike) free augmented-reality app that has become an enormous, global success since its launch this past July.* It is criticized for the way “‘mindless’ players trespass and break laws, finding dead bodies and trouble” and “as corporatist, detached from social reality, and ultimately a fantasy disguised to obfuscate class and racial tensions.”

And Goldfarb’s argument? In his view, Pokémon GO has radical effects as it is—and even more radical potential as it might be reconfigured. Thus, for example, while some of Pokémon GO’s Pokéstops (locations where players receive items and can place “lures”) are capitalist stores, others are interesting landmarks, including the gazebo where police killed Tamir Rice in 2014.

Since Pokémon Go incentivizes gathering through lures, it creates a hub around this spot and one that inevitably begins to generate talking, thinking, and perhaps even organizing. Those who are uninterested in social justice and come to catch Pokémon find themselves confronted with the hard social reality.

And the development of the game’s content is just at the beginning. So, in psychoanalytic terms, it’s currently an “empty signifier” that, if the Left takes it seriously, “can help mobilize an alternative version with more political Pokéstops and incentivize communitarianism.”

Pokémon Go is no-doubt problematic, but it also burgeons with radical potential. The Left should never smugly dismiss such explosive sites – that’s the job of beautiful soul liberals. Rather the task of an authentic left is to engage in the muckraking work of illuminating and presencing these points of radical potential.

And, who knows, with the proper encouragement, Pokémon GO players and hackers might end up hatching their own noncapitalist utopia.

 

*I’ve never played Pokémon GO but I do know, through reading, that it involves finding, incubating, and hatching “eggs.” Apparently, there are different kinds of eggs out there.

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I know I shouldn’t. But there are so many wrong-headed assertions in the latest Bloomberg column by Noah Smith, “Economics Without Math Is Trendy, But It Doesn’t Add Up,” that I can’t let it pass.

But first let me give him credit for his opening observation, one I myself have made plenty of times on this blog and elsewhere:

There’s no question that mainstream academic macroeconomics failed pretty spectacularly in 2008. It didn’t just fail to predict the crisis — most models, including Nobel Prize-winning ones, didn’t even admit the possibility of a crisis. The vast majority of theories didn’t even include a financial sector.

And in the deep, long recession that followed, mainstream macro theory failed to give policymakers any consistent guidance as to how to respond. Some models recommended fiscal stimulus, some favored forward guidance by the central bank, and others said there was simply nothing at all to be done.

It is, in fact, as Smith himself claims, a “dismal record.”

But then Smith goes off the tracks, with a long series of misleading and mistaken assertions about economics, especially heterodox economics. Let me list some of them:

  • citing a mainstream economist’s characterization of heterodox economics (when he could have, just as easily, sent readers to the Heterodox Economics Directory—or, for that matter, my own blog posts on heterodox economics)
  • presuming that heterodox economics is mostly non-quantitative (although he might have consulted any number of books by economists from various heterodox traditions or journals in which heterodox economists publish articles, many of which contain quantitative—theoretical and empirical—work)
  • equating formal, mathematical, and quantitative (when, in fact, one can find formal models that are neither mathematical nor quantitative)
  • also equating nonquantitative, broad, and vague (when, in fact, there is plenty of nonquantitative work in economics that is quite specific and unambiguous)
  • arguing that nonquantitative economics is uniquely subject to interpretation and reinterpretation (as against, what, the singular meaning of the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium system or the utility-maximization that serves as the microfoundations of mainstream macroeconomics?)
  • concluding that “heterodox economics hasn’t really produced a replacement for mainstream macro”

Actually, this is the kind of quick and easy dismissal of whole traditions—from Karl Marx to Hyman Minsky—most heterodox economists are quite familiar with.

My own view, for what it’s worth, is that there’s no need for work in economics to be formal, quantitative, or mathematical (however those terms are defined) in order for it be useful, valuable, or insightful (again, however defined)—including, of course, work in traditions that run from Marx to Minsky, that focused on the possibility of a crisis, warned of an impending crisis, and offered specific guidances of what to do once the crisis broke out.

But if Smith wants some heterodox macroeconomics that uses some combination of formal, mathematical, and quantitative techniques he need look no further than a volume of essays that happens to have been published in 2009 (and therefore written earlier), just as the crisis was spreading across the United States and the world economy. I’m referring to Heterodox Macroeconomics: Keynes, Marx and Globalization, edited by Jonathan P. Goldstein and Michael G. Hillard.

There, Smith will find the equation at the top of the post, which is very simple but contains an idea that one will simply not find in mainstream macroeconomics. It’s merely an income share-weighted version of a Keynesian consumption function (for a two-class world), which has the virtue of placing the distribution of income at the center of the macroeconomic story.* Add to that an investment function, which depends on the profit rate (which in turn depends on the profit share of income and capacity utilization) and you’ve got a system in which “alterations in the distribution of income can have important and potentially offsetting impacts on the level of effective demand.”

And heterodox traditions within macroeconomics have built on these relatively simply ideas, including

a microfounded Keynes–Marx theory of investment that further incorporates the external financing of investment based upon uncertain future profits, the irreversibility of investment and the coercive role of competition on investment. In this approach, the investment function is extended to depend on the profit rate, long-term and short-term heuristics for the firm’s financial robustness and the intensity of competition. It is the interaction of these factors that fundamentally alters the nature of the investment function, particularly the typical role assigned to capacity utilization. The main dynamic of the model is an investment-induced growth-financial safety tradeoff facing the firm. Using this approach, a ceteris paribus increase in the financial fragility of the firm reduces investment and can be used to explain autonomous financial crises. In addition, the typical behavior of the profit rate, particularly changes in income shares, is preserved in this theory. Along these lines, the interaction of the profit rate and financial determinants allows for real sector sources of financial fragility to be incorporated into a macro model. Here, a profit squeeze that shifts expectations of future profits forces firms and lenders to alter their perceptions on short-term and long-term levels of acceptable debt. The responses of these agents can produce a cycle based on increases in financial fragility.

It’s true: such a model does not lead to a specific forecast or prediction. (In fact, it’s more a long-term model than an explanation of short-run instabilities.) But it does provide an understanding of the movements of consumption and investment that help to explain how and why a crisis of capitalism might occur. Therefore, it represents a replacement for the mainstream macroeconomics that exhibited a dismal record with respect to the crash of 2007-08.

But maybe it’s not the lack of quantitative analysis in heterodox macroeconomics that troubles Smith so much. Perhaps it’s really the conclusion—the fact that

The current crisis combines the development of under-consumption, over-investment and financial fragility tendencies built up over the last 25 years and associated with a nance- led accumulation regime.

And, for that constellation of problems, there’s no particular advice or quick fix for Smith’s “policymakers and investors”—except, of course, to get rid of capitalism.

 

*Technically, consumption (C) is a function of the marginal propensity to consume of labor, labor’s share of income, the marginal propensity to consume of capital, and the profit share of income.

 

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Every once in a while, a reader sends me the link to an article and asks me what I think of it.

The most recent one is Geoff Gilbert’s [ht: db] piece, “Who Plans the Economy? Imagining Fair and Free Trade.”

Clearly, at least in terms of U.S. presidential politics (but also, I think, in the United Kingdom and across Europe), the issue of international trade is “hot.” Donald Trump has certainly focused on the downside of U.S. trade details (such as NAFTA, which he has promised to “immediately renegotiate. . .to get a better deal for our workers”), as has Bernie Sanders (who eventually succeeded in pulling Hillary Clinton in that direction).

Gilbert, for his part, argues that

The way we talk about trade is all wrong. We’re told we have two options: the “free” trade status quo or protectionism. But many other possibilities exist, if we are willing to entertain different rules for owning and controlling capital both within and between countries.

I think he’s right. The free trade versus protectionism argument is exactly the way the debate has been framed across the history of capitalism and within mainstream economics. Capitalists and mainstream economists have been mostly in favor of free trade, which they then counterpose to protectionism, that is, one or another regulation of or barrier to free trade (such as national content legislation, tariffs, and so forth).

That’s it? Those are the limits within which we can discuss international economics? It’s just like the debate between markets and planning or export-led and import-substitution development—a false, narrowly circumscribed debate, and often a pitfall, especially for critics of free trade. Many times (as with Trump, Sanders, and now Clinton), they end up criticizing free-trade agreements because of their negative impact on workers but then moving in the direction of one or another kind of protectionism, as if that’s the only alternative.

And while Gilbert is correct in arguing that free trade is “corporate-managed trade for corporate interests,” he fails to recognize that protectionism is, too. Both Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List sought to protect “infant industries” from foreign competition just as the U.S. steel and sugar industries did a couple of centuries later—and there many examples in between. They were all defending”corporate-managed trade for corporate interests,” but in the form of protectionism.

In fact, as I argued back in 2011 (in criticizing Harvard economist Greg Mankiw), the whole idea of international trade as trade between individuals (from which we all benefit, at least on aggregate) is profoundly misleading.

What Mankiw and other neoclassical economists refuse to understand is that, when international trade takes place, it has nothing to do with an individual in one country (say, the United States) buying a scarf from an individual in another country (say, China) as if they were just equal neighbors engaging in a mutually beneficial transaction. There are other economic processes involved. The consumers in the United States sell their ability to work to a corporation, and then use their wage or salary to purchase goods, some of which are produced in other countries. Some of those corporations have decided to produce goods in other countries, and thus to export jobs, while other corporations have decided to purchase the goods they sell either from their own subsidiaries in other countries or from corporations located in other countries. And in those other countries, the workers are not deciding to sell their goods to consumers in the United States; the corporations they work for are making those decisions.

Simply put, international trade doesn’t take place either between individual consumers and producers or between countries. International trade takes place between and, increasingly, within corporations located within different nations. They make the decisions about where and how goods will be produced, and where and how people will be employed.

What people who actually work for a living understand all too well is that both the much-vaunted freedom in free trade and the supposed unfreedom of protectionism are merely different ways corporations and their representatives have, at different times and places, chosen to structure international trade to advance their own interests.*

That’s certainly what Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels understood in the mid-nineteenth century, when free trade was also being hotly contested.

The question of Free Trade or Protection moves entirely within the bounds of the present system of capitalist production, and has, therefore, no direct interest for us socialists who want to do away with that system.

But if we refuse the narrow and misleading terms of free-trade-versus-protectionism debate (as both Gilbert and I believe we need to), does that mean we have nothing else to say or propose?**

Fair trade is one such alternative. Starting in the mid-1990s, George DeMartino has suggested one possibility: a fair-trade policy based on a Social Index Tariff Structure.*** The basic idea is as follows:

SITS is a multilateral trade regime that would promote benevolent means by which countries seek to improve their trade performance and growth while at the same time punishing countries that pursue export-promoting strategies that undermine human development, equality or sustainability. It does this through a multilateral system of social tariffs.

It can be thought of as a leveling-up, rather than a race-to-the-bottom, approach to international trade—a way of taking areas of economic and social life out of competition, rather than subjecting them to the competitive pressures entailed in both free-trade and the usual protectionist approaches.

Gilbert, in invoking the Mondragón Cooperative and targeted tariffs, makes a similar argument (although, to correct one point, that’s not what Raúl Prebisch and UNCTAD were attempting to do in the 1940s and 1950s) :

The idea is to use tariffs to favor goods produced by democratically owned and controlled capital at home and throughout the world.

Any systemic solution to inequality and mass economic deprivation will need to expand the amount and types of people who get to make the investment decisions that determine where industry and jobs will exist and at what pay.

One can make exactly the same argument about free trade—to expand trade (either within or across national boundaries) by democratically owned and controlled enterprises.

What are we left with then? To my mind, we can refuse the terms of the existing debate between free trade and protectionism and, at the same time, speak out in favor of either free-trade or protectionist policies as long as the goal is to build and expand institutions and spaces “capable of actually placing investment decision-making in the hands of the people.”

 

*Perhaps less understood is the fact that, as I argued three years ago, “much of the international trade that takes place these days does not occur through market transactions.” Instead, a great deal of trade occurs within corporations; it is intra-firm trade, transactions among and between different parts of giant multinational corporations, that is planned by the corporate directors.

**Marx’s own famous option was to speak in favor of free trade because, as Engels explains,

To him, Free Trade is the normal condition of modern capitalist production. Only under Free Trade can the immense productive powers of steam, of electricity, of machinery, be full developed; and the quicker the pace of this development, the sooner and the more fully will be realized its inevitable results; society splits up into two classes, capitalists here, wage-laborers there; hereditary wealth on one side, hereditary poverty on the other; supply outstripping demand, the markets being unable to absorb the ever growing mass of the production of industry; an ever recurring cycle of prosperity, glut, crisis, panic, chronic depression, and gradual revival of trade, the harbinger not of permanent improvement but of renewed overproduction and crisis; in short, productive forces expanding to such a degree that they rebel, as against unbearable fetters, against the social institutions under which they are put in motion; the only possible solution: a social revolution, freeing the social productive forces from the fetters of an antiquated social order, and the actual producers, the great mass of the people, from wage slavery. And because Free Trade is the natural, the normal atmosphere for this historical evolution, the economic medium in which the conditions for the inevitable social revolution will be the soonest created — for this reason, and for this alone, did Marx declare in favor of Free Trade.

***DeMartino has outlined that policy in a series of articles, including “The Social Index Tariff Structure: An Internationalist Response to Economic Integration (with Stephen Cullenberg), in the Review of Radical Political Economics (1994, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 76-85) and “Achieving Fair Trade Through a Social Tariff Regime: A Policy Thought Experiment” (with Jonathan D. Moyer and Kate M. Watkins), in the Cambridge Journal of Economics (2016, vol. 40, pp. 69-92) (unfortunately, behind paywalls).

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I cited Andrew O’Heir’s critical review of Boom Bust Boom, Terry Jones and Theo Kocken’s Monty Pythonesque documentary about the crash of 2007-08 back in March but I hadn’t seen the film itself until last night.

In many ways, I wish I hadn’t.

Oh, sure, there are a couple of good moments. Introducing the work of Hyman Minsky to a larger audience. A cameo by John Cusack, who suggests that economics students should pelt their professors with vegetables and rotten fruit if they continue to parrot the party line. “Maybe urinate on them. That’s what I would do.” And some well-deserved attention to the students in the Post-Crash Economics Society at the University of Manchester.

But otherwise, the film is just not very good. For starters, consider the fact that, after the worst crisis of capitalism since the first Great Depression, only once is capitalism itself even mentioned!

Then, as O’Heir wrote, there’s not a single mention of John Maynard Keynes (who published his General Theory in 1936, in the midst of the earlier depression), let alone Karl Marx (who, along with Friedrich Engels, was writing about capitalism’s crisis tendencies in the middle of the nineteenth century). Since Jones and Kocken decided to make forgetting a central part of their story—especially failing to remember and draw lessons from previous financial crises—they might also have mentioned the deliberate forgetting by mainstream economists and economic policymakers of other economic ideas, now as in the past.

And, in this day and age, it smacks viewers in the face that, as Shane Ferro wrote, “Women and minorities are almost entirely left out of this film—not unlike the way they’ve been left out of financial and economics professions.” The only two expert women the movie manages to feature are Lucy Prebble, a playwright who once wrote a play about the collapse of Enron, and Laurie Santos, a Yale psychology professor who studies how monkeys make decisions. Neither, as it turns out, has a background in economics, or much knowledge of capitalism, its history, or the 2007-08 crash.*

But the worst part of this high-budget, cleverly animated documentary is the actual story Terry and Kocken decided to tell. What it boils down to is this: financial crises have always been with us (at least since Tulip Mania in the 1630s), people tend to make irrational decisions (e.g, by forgetting about previous crises and taking on too much risk), and making irrational decisions is part of our human nature, as determined by evolutionary behavioral psychology (hence the monkeys).

Actually, the film is more confused than that. At one point, it features Minsky (in an animated dialogue with his son)—and, if it had continued in that vein, it would have been able to reveal something about the financial fragility inherent in the regular boom-and-bust cycles of capitalism (since the key actors in Minsky’s approach are capitalist enterprises and banks). But then Minksy is dropped and the filmmakers decide to go in a different direction, with a fanciful discussion of human nature (continuing an approach that, from the beginning, features an undifferentiated “we” who is responsible for speculation, risk-taking, euphoria, forgetting, and so on) and then an attempt to ground human nature in primate behavior (this after criticizing the scientistic pretensions of neoclassical economics).

There’s no attempt to identify the dynamics of a particular economic system, which we usually refer to as capitalism. No attempt to identify particular and differentiated actors and institutions within capitalism, such as bankers, workers, consumers, politicians, enterprises, financial markets, and so on. No references to other countries today, in addition to the United States and the United Kingdom. No mention of the grotesques levels of inequality in the lead-up to the crash, and no discussion of unemployment, poverty, homelessness, and so on after the crash.

Instead, what we are presented with is a succession of financial crises, which in the end are grounded in our singular human nature.

That, to say the least, is not a particularly insightful analysis of the causes and consequences of the crash. And the best the filmmakers and the various talking heads can come up with by way of policies is the need, since human nature can’t be changed, to regulate the financial system (perhaps, at its most adventurous, by restoring Glass-Steagal barriers between commercial and investment banking) to keep “us” from making the same mistakes.

To which we can all respond: “Been there, done that. Now let’s try something that might actually work, beginning with the inherent instabilities of capitalism itself.”

 

*Here’s the list of the contributors: Dan Ariely, Dirk Bezemer, Zvi Bodie, Willem Buiter, John Cassidy, John Cusack, John K. Galbraith, James K. Galbraith, Andy Haldane, Daniel Kahneman, Steve Keen, Stephen Kinsella, Larry Kotlikoff, Paul Krugman, George Magnus, Paul Mason, Perry Mehrling, Hyman P. Minsky, Alan Minsky, Lucy Prebble, Laurie Santos, Robert J. Shiller, Nathan Tankus, Sweder Van Wijnbergen, and Randall Wray.

Legal fake money

Posted: 18 July 2016 in Uncategorized
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Often times, people’s economic ingenuity—outside and opposed to run-of-the-mill economic and political thought—is truly impressive.

Such is the case in a far corner of southern Italy, where “transactions in fake currency are not only accepted by local shopkeepers, they are positively encouraged.”

The small Calabrian town of Gioiosa Ionica, population 7,000, is currently home to a group of asylum seekers, who are given the imitation bank notes, or “tickets” as they are known, as part of a voucher system.

The refugees can spend the cash on whatever they like, but only in the town, so that local businesses benefit.

Rather than featuring European architectural gems, they bear the likenesses of a collection of communists and leftist leaders – Che Guevara on the fake €10 note, Hugo Chavez on the €20 and Karl Marx on the €50.

The reverse sides feature the signature of Giovanni Maiolo, the co-ordinator of the town’s refugee services.

Karl Rove

Wall Street Journal columnist Daniel Henninger tries to be witty by referring to the “Trumpen proletariat” and citing Marx’s colorful characterization of the lumpenproletariat in 1850s Paris:

Alongside decayed roués with dubious means of subsistence and of dubious origin, alongside ruined and adventurous offshoots of the bourgeoisie, were vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jailbirds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, maquereaux, brothel keepers, porters, literati, organ grinders, ragpickers, knife grinders, tinkers, beggars—in short, the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither, which the French call la bohème.

He then proceeds to invoke the usual Republican shibboleth of the “culture wars” instead of reading on in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte:

This Bonaparte, who constitutes himself chief of the lumpenproletariat, who here alone rediscovers in mass form the interests which he personally pursues, who recognizes in this scum, offal, refuse of all classes the only class upon which he can base himself unconditionally, is the real Bonaparte, the Bonaparte sans phrase. An old, crafty roué, he conceives the historical life of the nations and their performances of state as comedy in the most vulgar sense, as a masquerade in which the grand costumes, words, and postures merely serve to mask the pettiest knavery.

The fact is, Henninger’s party has chosen Trump as George Bush’s successor. And the tragedy that was Bush has now been publicly confirmed—first, in the biography by Jean Edward Smith (“Rarely in the history of the United States has the nation been so ill-served as during the presidency of George W. Bush.”), and then in the Chilcot report (which is even more an indictment of Bush’s war crimes than it is of Tony Blair’s misleading his country into war).

But perhaps the farce today is not just Trump but the choice between him and Hillary Clinton—the former threatening anarchy as the representative of the the party of order, the latter order having saved the party from presumed anarchy (which is how they saw the possibility of democratic socialism). Both will pretend to campaign on behalf of the disenfranchised but that’s only an attempt “to make the lower classes happy within the framework of bourgeois society,” not to actually change the circumstances that leave the lower classes further and further behind the tiny group at the top.

That group of wealthy individuals and large corporations don’t know what to do with Trump, because it seems they can’t control him—but they certainly can live with Clinton, who takes their money and is willing to do their bidding even as her machine calculates the demographics and counts the votes coming from the other classes.

The 2016 presidential campaign will be a grand spectacle but now, even before the conventions, we know who will win. And the rest, including the nation’s growing lumpenproletariat, will be the losers.