Posts Tagged ‘planning’

Maarten-Vanden-Eynde-The-Invisible-Hand-Art-Brussels2

Maarten Vanden Eynde, The Invisible Hand (2015)*

We hear it all the time. On a regular basis. Having to do with pretty much everything.

Why is the price of gasoline so high? Mainstream economists respond, “it’s the market.” Or if you think you deserve a pay raise, the answer again is, “go get another offer and we’ll see if you’re worth it according to ‘the market’.”

Alternatively, if you want to solve a particularly pressing problem—such as climate change, widespread unemployment, or Third World poverty—mainstream economists’ usual answer is “let markets handle it.”**

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Markets have a magical, quasi-mystical status within mainstream economics. They are both the original starting-point and far-reaching conclusion of mainstream economic theory. What I mean, first, is markets are there at the very beginning, without any explanation of where they come from or how they are formed—although there may be an occasional nod to Adam Smith (who famously invoked a natural “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another”) or Robinson Crusoe (which presents, on one reading of Daniel Defoe’s novel, the model of two individuals who trade to their mutual benefit under conditions of equality, reciprocity, and freedom).*** Otherwise, markets are just there, with the requisite price and quantity axes and supply and demand schedules, as the starting point for economic analysis. Then, after a great deal of theoretical work (concerning the underlying determinants and the final consequences), markets are declared to be the best solution to the problem of scarcity (in finding a perfect balance between limited means and unlimited desires).

After min. wage

The “proof” of the superiority of markets often occurs in two steps (although today, in the usual sloppy teaching of mainstream economics, the second step is left out). At the level of individual markets, mainstream economists’ argue that economic welfare—consisting of the sum of consumer and producer surplus—is maximized at equilibrium. “Consumer surplus” is the extra benefit enjoyed by consumers in a market who pay less for goods and services than they were willing and able to pay for it (areas A + B + C, in the diagram above). Meanwhile, “producer surplus” is the difference between what producers are willing and able to supply a good for and the price they actually receive (areas E + D). At the equilibrium, the sum of the two is at its maximum. In contrast, when the market is not at equilibrium (such as when there’s a minimum wage, a wage rate above the market equilibrium wage rate, the green line in the diagram), there’s a “deadweight loss” (consisting of C + D). As far as mainstream economists are concerned, each market in equilibrium (whether for oranges or labor) creates the most total welfare for market participants.

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What about the market system as a whole? Here, the argument is somewhat different. It’s a theory about efficiency, not welfare.**** Mainstream economists claim that, when taken together (in what is referred to as general equilibrium), markets can generate a set of prices that finds a point—for example, A, B, or C, in the diagram above—on the “production possibilities frontier.”***** That’s the maximum amount an economy, given its technology and resources, can produce. Any point inside the frontier (such as D) represents an inefficient allocation of resources (more can be produced of either or both goods without the kind of tradeoff that occurs on the frontier). Importantly, Pareto efficiency means that no one can be made better off without making someone worse off.

That’s the remarkable, counter-intuitive conclusion of the mainstream theory of markets: everyone—every individual and society as a whole—benefits in a world in which all households and firms make decisions based solely on their own self-interest.

Thus, mainstream economists’ celebrations of the market and market solutions for all economic and social problems rely on both the presumption of markets as the given starting-point of analysis and their sweeping conclusions, concerning individual markets and the market system as a whole.

It is, of course, easy to criticize one or another of the assumptions underlying the celebration of free markets, many of them formulated by mainstream economists themselves. For example, markets may have “negative externalities,” that is, social costs that are greater than private costs (pollution is a common example). Under such conditions, more of a good or service will be produced than is socially beneficial. Monopoly power also distorts markets, since with market power firms will produce less, at a higher price, than if they operated according to the model of perfect competition (and, as mainstream economists are now discovering, it’s likely they will pay lower wages).****** Imperfect and asymmetric information, too, will lead to inefficient market outcomes—such as, for example, when conflicts of interest arise between a principal and an agent in a firm or banks are able to sell more financial products (such as derivatives) if they can conceal the true level of risk.

Thus, we can understand the two poles of debate within mainstream economics. Economists within the conservative or libertarian free-market wing celebrate free markets and criticize any and all forms of government intervention, while those in the more liberal wing focus on market imperfections and call for more government regulation of markets. Once again, it’s the invisible hand versus the invisible hand.

But underlying and informing the debate between the two wings of mainstream economics is a shared utopianism of markets as the best, natural and most efficient way of allocating goods and services—including labor, money, and natural resources. They may and often do disagree about the necessity and effectiveness of freeing-up or regulating markets, which comes down to whether or not they “see” exceptions to the basic model of perfect markets. But they share a belief that the logic of decentralized private markets is the appropriate way of thinking about and organizing the “world of goods.” In other words, mainstream economists debate, often intensely and with no small degree of sneering and sarcasm, the best way of getting markets to operate correctly—but that’s only because they utilize the same basic theory according to which a properly functioning market system is the only appropriate foundation and goal for theory and policy. Market fundamentalism thus represents the utopian horizon of mainstream economics.

The critique of market fundamentalism starts where mainstream economics leaves off—with the idea that the world of goods can and should be organized by markets.*******It highlights the hidden ground of the mainstream theory of markets and calls into question the very possibility of market exchange. The result is a different utopian horizon, which both refuses the self-suturing conception of market value and opens up the realm of possibility for other ways of organizing economic and social life.

When mainstream economists blithely draw the diagram or write down the equations for a market, what they’re doing is presuming—while failing to mention, let alone discuss—a whole host of conditions. Callari focuses on mainstream economists’ “image of the economy as a world of goods, and of the world of goods as a homogeneous field.” Such an image serves as the foundation for the positing of calculable “interests,” which thus become the central code of the economy and society. Within the homogeneous field of goods, every action can be connected with every other action in a measured (that is, analytically calculable) way. Once all the appropriate calculations are completed, “the market”—both individual markets and the market system as a whole—finds its equilibrium, the self-suturing reconciliation of all the competing interests. It also closes off the field of goods to any inspiration or influence other than self-interested rationality—be they traditions, social obligations, or ethical commitments.

Taking up on and extending that point, Amariglio argues that many of the features of non-market transactions involving goods and services (such as the gift) also haunt market exchanges.

There is nothing at all “certain” about any act of exchange, and nothing in it less symbolic or less “about” power, responsibility, meaning, and so forth. Likewise, there is something fundamentally “constituted” and “constituting” about identities and subjectivities in every act of exchange. Leaving aside the question of the multiplicity within selves who enter into trades, the fact remains that exchange is a very overloaded activity, and trading partners not only may be of several different minds about the transaction, but are often uncertain as to what exactly such transactions “mean” in terms of their own or others’ wealth and property, the effects on their well-being, who or what subject positions they occupy, what exactly is being traded, and so forth.

Market exchanges are therefore crosscut—just like any other allocative transaction, be it the gift, planning, or plunder—with a whole host of perturbations and undecidables. Both markets and the interests they are said to represent rely on “external” (historical and social) conditions and are, in different times and spaces, characterized by considerable uncertainty and indeterminacy. And once we begin to investigate those conditions, once we begin to analyze the “openness” of markets, we are forced to confront the ability of any act of exchange—and, for that matter, any economic discourse about markets—to successfully suture itself, at least in any kind of “permanent” act of closure.

The impossibility of market exchange, in general, suggests the need to recognize and attend to the historical and social specificity of individual markets—without any overarching, general theory of price or exchange-value. It also opens the door both to other commitments, whether ethical or political, and to other means of transacting goods and services, as they imply different conditions and consequences for society, for the social relations among persons, things, and nature.

Imagining and enacting those possibilities represent the utopian horizon of the critique of markets and mainstream economists’ theory of the market system.

 

*The Invisible Hand is a rubber copy of the right hand of Leopold II, taken at night from the 1926 sculpture by Thomas Vinçotte, located at the Regentlaan in Brussels, Belgium. The mould was taken to a former rubber plantation in Kasai-Occidental in the Democratic Republic of Congo and filled with natural rubber. The rubber hand was presented at Art Brussels 2015. It refers both to Adam Smith’s theory (as elaborated in the Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations) and to Leopold II’s use of the International African Association (1877-79) and later the Congo Free State (1885-1908) to pillage the available natural resources. The grotesque result is that, by doing so, he “unwittingly” instigated local economic growth but at a high price: more than 10 million people are estimated to have died as a consequence of Leopold’s “Invisible Hand.” The Invisible Hand also points to the custom of chopping off the hands of enslaved people to ensure the rubber quota. To paraphrase Marx, markets come “dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt.”

**With one notable exception: healthcare.

***The Robinson Crusoe story has been read in a radically different vein by many heterodox economists, including Stephen Hymer and Ulla Grapard.

****Mostly because of Kenneth Arrow’s “Impossibility Theorem,” which challenged the idea that there’s a procedure for deriving a collective or “social” ordering—a Social Welfare Function—based on individual preferences.

*****While mainstream economists can claim to have solved the problem of “existence” (i.e., that there is such a set of prices consistent with overall efficiency), much to their consternation they have not been able to prove either “stability” (that prices, if away from the equilibrium set will move toward the equilibrium) or “uniqueness” (in other words, there may be many such sets of prices).

******That’s why, as I teach my students, there is such a thing as a free lunch: just abolish monopolies and oligopolies, and the economy can increase production (technically, the economy can move from inside to the production possibilities frontier without any additional resources or new technology, just by eliminating imperfect competition).

*******The critique I present here is inspired by two key essays—Antonio Callari’s “The Ghost of the Gift: The Unlikelihood of Economics” and Jack Amariglio’s “Give the Ghost a Chance! A Comrade’s Shadowy Addendum—both published in The Question of the Gift: Essays Across the Disciplines, edited by Mark Osteen. It is also informed by research that appeared in Postmodern Moments in Modern Economics, by Amariglio and myself.

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The Department of Political Economy at the University of Sydney has posted the text of the talk I delivered at Gleebooks, 19 October 2016, as part of a “Class Acts in Political Economy” roundtable with Katherine Gibson and Adam David Morton.

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Harry G. Frankfurt (the author of, among other books, On Bullshit) attempts to argue that we aren’t, or at least shouldn’t be, concerned about inequality.

I suspect that people who profess to have this intuition are actually not responding to the inequality they perceive but to another feature of the situation they are observing. What I believe they find intuitively to be morally objectionable in circumstances of economic inequality is not that some of the individuals in those circumstances have less money than others. Rather, it is the fact that those with less have too little.

Branko Milanovic correctly reminds Frankfurt that all our needs are social needs. Thus, there’s no way of distinguishing between “authentic” and “inauthentic” needs and thus no way of being concerned about poverty without worry about inequality.

So, his reasoning brings him back to the beginning where he is unable to define needs as separate from the context where they are expressed. He is  unable to do so because he is unable to distinguish between the so-called “authentic” needs and those that we develop simply by living in a society from the very moment when we are born.We cannot define what the “good life” is independently of the others.

So, his whole edifice crumbles.

Indeed.

That’s one dimension of the problem: all our needs are social needs. (And as Jack Amariglio and I argued back in Postmodern Moments, the modernist Marxian argument that “planning can succeed where markets could not in discerning all of the needs underlying the plan and in calculating all of the effects of instituting it” is “unhelpful and ultimately damaging in distinguishing between capitalism and socialism.”)

But there’s another dimension of the problem: the existence of inequality is bad for everyone within society, the rich and middle class as well as the poor (the argument made by Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson), and it is literally a killing field (because, as Göran Therborn has argued, millions of people die premature deaths because of it).

Taken together—the idea that all needs are social needs and that inequality kills individuals and society as a whole—we really do need to be concerned about the grotesque (and rising) levels of inequality in the world today.

To argue otherwise is bullshit.

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Critics of capitalism and capitalist alienation (such as Chris Dillow) may have given up on the possibility of noncapitalist planning too quickly.

Part of the problem is, planning has become identified with the grandiose 5-year plans and top-down decisionmaking associated with the state capitalism of the Soviet Union. However, what if there are other models of planning?

One such example is Cybersyn [ht: tm], the cybernetic planning system that was conceived in Salvador Allende’s Chile (but never completed before his violent overthrow) to cope with the “messy jumble of factories, mines and other workplaces that had long been state-run, others that were freshly nationalised, some under worker occupation and others still under the control of their managers or owners.”

Clearly, as Greg Borenstein and Jem Axelrod explain, the Chilean experiment, as designed by British cybernetics-management consultant Stafford Beer, was a model of ultramodernist omniscience and ominpotence. I wonder what a postmodernist model of planning for a noncapitalist economy would look like today.

When planning succeeds

Posted: 16 October 2012 in Uncategorized
Tags: , , ,

Yesterday, I made the argument that the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics can be interpreted as an award for the design of nonmarkets, that is, for mechanisms that can be used when markets fail.

Arindrajit Dube would appear to agree:

The use of the word “market” in describing exchanges of every sort has become ubiquitous, even in cases where there is no actual price that helps clear the market or channel information. Perhaps due to this slippage, an interesting fact about the work receiving the award has been largely ignored. The concrete applications that are discussed as ways of “improving the performance of many markets”–such as matching residents to hospitals, matching donors to organs, and students to schools–are not really “markets.” At least not if we think of markets as institutions where prices help clear supply and demand. Instead, they involve non-market interactions, where the matches are actually formed by centralized exchanges. In these situations, decentralized and uncoordinated matching can produce unstable and inefficient matches, and gains are possible from centralization of some sort. Sometimes the price may not exist because of legal restrictions, but in other cases the participants may voluntarily forego using prices, as it might conflict with other objectives. This is exactly where the Gale-Shapley algorithm can be useful in implementing a “stable” allocation: an allocation where no pair-wise trades exist which can make both parties better off, which is one notion of optimality. In other words, this and similar algorithms can help implement … gasp! … economic planning. . .

A final note. A popular view today is that it is not possible to implement an efficient allocation using planning because people don’t have the incentives to reveal their true preferences to begin with, which makes this whole exercise rather pointless. A variant of this position was originally articulated by Austrian economists, including Ludwig von Mises, during the so called “socialist calculation” debate of the early 20th century. And in many cases this criticism rings true. However, it does not follow that the truthful revelation problem is ubiquitous. For example, it is interesting to note that Alvin Roth and Elliott Peranson show (both theoretically and empirically) that when implementing optimal matching, this problem may be smaller than one might imagine: when each applicant only interviews a small number of positions overall, the gains from strategic manipulation of preferences are small. This, too, has important implications for the “socialist calculation” debate, as it suggests that for a range of cases, a centralized exchange implementing planning without using prices can (and indeed does) implement relatively efficient allocations. And it can do so without having distributional effects such as rationing kidneys out of the reach of the 99 percent by using prices to allocate organs.

So when asked by our students and friends “what was the ‘Nobel’ all about?” we could do a lot worse than by answering “economic planning.”

They just don’t get it.

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson continue to insist that:

1. The Mycenaean palaces of the Aegean Late Bronze Age were based on central planning, notwithstanding new information stemming from the study of ancient economies that reveal “characteristics of decentralized economies and even vibrant markets.”

2. Central planning “involves the suppression of markets and price systems for the governing institutions and elites to better extract resources and politically and economically control society.”

3. Markets do not involve “the recruitment of goods and services for the benefit of a group not coterminous with the contributing members.”

After all this time, the simple planning-market dichotomy continues to structure neoclassical theories of historical and comparative development.

We’ll fulfill five-year plan in four years!

Neoclassical economics has long been structured around the dichotomy between markets and planning as alternative mechanisms for the efficient allocation of resources. And, of course, neoclassical economists have long concluded that decentralized markets are better at that task than central planning.

The problem with that formulation is that it presumes there’s one essential economic problem—the efficient allocation of scarce resources—and that markets and planning are just different ways of accomplishing the same objective. In other words, it’s an approach that denies the role of history and social conditions, that different economic institutions—such as markets and forms of planning—arise under (and in turn serve to create) different historical and social conditions.

Now, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson want to modify the discussion but keep the same method. In their view, “central planning is not about the efficient allocation of economic resources, it is about control.”

Central planning maximizes the extent of control that the state, and the people running the state, exercise. The desire to control others is a constant in history and is part and parcel of the construction of states. If the state can grab all the land and resources and control who and on what terms people get access to them, then this maximizes control, even if it sacrifices economic efficiency.

This sort of economic and political control — not Marxist ideology — is what central planning is all about.

What they do is substitute one essence—the efficient allocation of scarce resources—with another—control by the elites through the state. The result is that planning remains a singular phenomenon, which they find throughout history: in the Greek Bronze Age, among the Incas, and in the Soviet Union.

Many additional issues can be raised about their approach. Let me mention two. First, I actually think they let Marxism off the hook too easily since, as Jack Amariglio and I argued in Postmodern Moments in Modern Economics, while central planning may not be mentioned in Marx’s writings, there is a long tradition of modernist Marxism that has preferred the presumed order of central planning over the disorder of markets. As we wrote:

The relativism (one-sidedness), uncertainty, and disorder of capitalism are overcome by rational planning whose objective basis—the victory of the proletariat, with its full appreciation of the totality—guarantees in advance the superiority of its knowledge and practice.

Postmodern Marxist economists could not but regard this view as unhelpful and ultimately damaging in distinguishing between capitalism and socialism. For it is clear, to postmodern Marxists at least, that socialism has been and will be beset with the multiplicity of knowledges and the radical uncertainty that goes along with the contingency of events and the persistence of ideology. The debilitating effects that, as many Marxists have pointed out, have been visited both on peoples living under socialist regimes and on the very concept of socialism can be tied directly to the claim by the party or state to have privileged (and not partisan) objective knowledge has been considerable. Socialist planning, in our view, will always be marked by the mediation of different knowledges and subjectivities, and the resulting plan, a contingent act if there ever was one, may need to declare itself as partisan, provisional, and uncertain of its effects if it is to avoid the disasters that have befallen planning mechanisms that have been infused with modernist explanations and ideals, utopian though they may have been.

In this sense, the totalizing promise of rational centralized planning is a modernist one. The declared partiality, relativism, and disorder of planning are, in contrast, postmodern.

And there’s a second issue: while I have no doubt that, in particular instances, state planning has been used to enrich elites, when will Acemoglu and Robinson discover that markets, too, under different historical and social conditions, have been mechanisms whereby elites “control and extract resources from society”?