Posts Tagged ‘unemployment’

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We already knew that the number of Americans who are on disability has skyrocketed over the past three decades. But the usual response has been that they’re gaming the system, claiming disabilities that “lend themselves to subjective manipulation” and being encouraged to do so by overly generous government payouts. Therefore, the conclusion is, “taxpayers are paying able-bodied Americans to drop out of the work force, increasing the burden on those who are still working.”

That was the existing common sense—the widely shared view that society had the responsibility (in the name of all “those who are still working”) to identify the truly disabled, weed out the others who are falsely claiming disability, and force them to get back to work.

Now we know, thanks to a recently published study by Anne Case and Angus Deaton, that something else has been going on: American workers are suffering from an “epidemic of pain, suicide, and drug overdoses.”

Specifically, Case and Deaton show that, after 1998, there was a marked increase in the morbidity and mortality of middle-aged white non-Hispanic men and women in the United States, especially for workers with less education.

The changes are dramatic. As we can see in the chart at the top of this post, even while mortality rates in other rich countries were declining (as were the rates for Hispanic and black Americans), U.S. white non-Hispanic mortality rose by half a percent per year. As they observed, “No other rich country saw a similar turnaround.” That turnaround in mortality was driven primarily by increasing death rates for those with a high-school degree or less. And, while their focus is on middle-age, they also make clear that all 5-year groups between 30 and 64 have also suffered increases in mortality.

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According to Case and Deaton, the three causes of death that account for the mortality reversal among white non-Hispanics are not lung cancer (which is declining) or diabetes (which has remained relatively constant), but drug and alcohol poisoning, suicide, and chronic liver diseases and cirrhosis. All three increased year-on-year after 1998.

And it’s not just that white Americans are being killed by this epidemic; they’re also increasingly victims of poor health, both physical and mental, as well as of pain and alcohol consumption. What we’re talking about here is a dramatic increase in the walking wounded (who often find it difficult to even walk).

The question is, why? Why have the rates of mortality and morbidity for white non-Hispanic Americans risen so dramatically in the past 15 years?

Case and Deaton suggest the epidemic may have been caused by the increased availability of opioid prescriptions for pain (although it’s not at clear if the increase in opioid use or the increase in pain came first) as well as growing economic insecurity (which started even before the crash of 2007-08), which may in fact continue into the future, given the shift away from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pension plans, if U.S. workers “perceive stock market risk harder to manage than earnings risk, or if they have contributed inadequately to defined-contribution plans.”

What they don’t mention is the role of jobs. The fact is, most Americans are forced to have the freedom to sell their ability to work to someone else—and they suffer both when they have a job and when they don’t. When they’re fortunate enough to have a job, they’re working in Walmart stores, Amazon warehouses, and fast-food restaurants and suffering the physical and mental pains and indignities imposed by their employers. And when they don’t have a job—when they’ve been discarded by their employers—they’re suffering from the jobs they once held and from the struggle to find another job. As a consequence of both having jobs and joblessness, an increasing number of middle-age Americans are dying, committing suicide, and are the victims of pain, poor health, and psychological distress. And, unless we do something about it, the middle-age Americans who do survive the current epidemic will carry their pain and ill health into old age.

And the corporate elite doesn’t want to take responsibility for having used up and pushed aside these Americans or, once they’re disabled, paying the taxes to support them. It has simply discarded them.

As for the political consequences, Paul Starr suggests we may be witnessing a “dire collapse of hope.”

The role of suicide, drugs, and alcohol in the white midlife mortality reversal is a signal of heightened desperation among a population in measurable decline. We are not talking merely about “status anxiety” due to rising immigrant populations and changing racial and gender relations. Nor are we talking only about stagnation in wages as if the problem were merely one of take-home pay. The phenomenon Case and Deaton have identified suggests a dire collapse of hope, and that same collapse may be propelling support for more radical political change. Much of that support is now going to Republican candidates, notably Donald Trump.

And, I would add, support to Kentucky’s new elected governor Matt Bevin and to Tea Party favorites in other states (such as Maine’s Paul LePage, Kansas’s Sam Brownback, and Wisconsin’s Scott Walker). They’ve all enacted—or promised to enact—a wide variety of radical measures, from Right to Work laws to restrictions on welfare and federally funded healthcare programs.

We now live in a society in which, on one hand, those at the top have simply disabled the white non-Hispanic working-class and left it to suffer “an epidemic of pain, suicide, and drug overdoses.” And, on the other hand, many of those same workers have responded, out of fear and hopelessness, by electing public officials who are making their plight even worse.

Chester Conklin and Charles Chaplin in a scene from MODERN TIMES, 1936.

While we’re referring to the thinking of eminent scientists on capitalism and socialism, consider Stephen Hawking’s answer to a question about automation and “the possibility of technological unemployment”:

I’m rather late to the question-asking party, but I’ll ask anyway and hope. Have you thought about the possibility of technological unemployment, where we develop automated processes that ultimately cause large unemployment by performing jobs faster and/or cheaper than people can perform them? Some compare this thought to the thoughts of the Luddites, whose revolt was caused in part by perceived technological unemployment over 100 years ago. In particular, do you foresee a world where people work less because so much work is automated? Do you think people will always either find work or manufacture more work to be done? Thank you for your time and your contributions. I’ve found research to be a largely social endeavor, and you’ve been an inspiration to so many.

Answer:

If machines produce everything we need, the outcome will depend on how things are distributed. Everyone can enjoy a life of luxurious leisure if the machine-produced wealth is shared, or most people can end up miserably poor if the machine-owners successfully lobby against wealth redistribution. So far, the trend seems to be toward the second option, with technology driving ever-increasing inequality.

In other words, the problem is not with machinery per se—which has the potential to create a “life of luxurious leisure”—but the capitalist use of machinery—which means “most people can end up miserably poor.”

The second option is more likely, according to Hawking, “if the machine-owners successfully lobby against wealth redistribution”—and, I would add, only if the rest of us are convinced by that lobbying.

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According to the new report of the Solutions for Youth Employment Coalition (pdf), prepared by the World Bank, the International Labor Organization, and other groups, what we see today is a “generation in economic crisis.”

That’s because youth make up nearly a quarter of the world’s population, and nearly 85 percent live in lower-income countries and fragile states, but young people account for roughly 40 percent of the world’s unemployed and are at least twice as likely—and up to four times more likely—to be unemployed than adults. As a result, in 2014, about 500 million youth were unemployed, inactive, underemployed, or working in insecure jobs.

And, over the next decade, a billion more young people will enter the job market but only 40 percent are expected to be able to enter jobs that currently exist. Therefore, the global economy will need to create 600 million jobs over the next ten years: that’s 5 million jobs each month simply to keep employment rates constant!

And if we don’t? Then, according to the authors of the report,

governments forgo tax revenue and incur the cost of social safety nets, unemployment benefits and insurances, and lost productivity. Businesses risk losing a generation of consumers. Social costs are ever mounting as well. The Arab Spring and subsequent youth-led uprisings in many countries, along with the rise of economic insurgency and youth extremism, demand that we explore the links between economic participation, inequality, and community security, crime, and national fragility through a lens focused on youth.

In other words, an entire generation will be lost.

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We all know (or should know) that, even though the official unemployment in the United States has dropped significantly in recent years, the effects of the combination of high rates of unemployment and of the long duration of being unemployed are still being felt by American workers.

And that’s exactly what Henry S. Farber found. Using data from the Displaced Workers Survey, he found that only 50 percent of job losers in the 2007-09 period where employed in January 2010, while about 56 percent of job losers 2007-2009 had held at least one subsequent job. Moreover, the probability of having held a job increased with the time since job loss. For example, 69 percent of workers who lost jobs in 2007 or 2008 had held at least one job by January 2010. In contrast, only 44 percent of workers who lost jobs in 2009 had held at least one job by January 2010. Finally, the fraction of workers who lost jobs in the 2011-13 period who subsequently found another job remains lower (at 68 percent) than in any period prior to the Great Recession.

Farber’s conclusion?

while job loss is a fact of life in the U.S., the employment consequences of job loss in the Great Recession have been unusually severe and remain substantial years later. Most importantly, job losers in the Great Recession and its aftermath have been much less successful at finding new jobs (particularly full-time jobs) than in earlier periods.

Many American workers found it difficult, if not impossible, to sell their ability to labor during and after the Great Recession. And today, years after the so-called recovery began, workers continue to suffer—both unemployed workers who have found it very difficult to find a new job and employed workers who have been “disciplined” by being forced to have the freedom to compete with unemployed and newly hired workers.

youth-unemployment

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There was a time when the youth (16-24 years) unemployment rate was below 10 percent (e.g., in the late 1990s and early 2000s) or below 9 percent (in the late 1960s) and even around 5-6 percent (in the early 1950s).

Now, however, the youth unemployment rate is above 12 percent—and has been since May 2008.