Posts Tagged ‘wages’


Special mention

20161201_strike Mexico Move


Special mention

187965_600 187848_600

Ask Him

Chris Dillow is right about one thing: citing globalization as the reason for the success of Donald Trump’s campaign, especially among working-class voters, “suits some people very well for foreigners to get the blame rather than for inequality and the health of capitalism to come under scrutiny.”

But that doesn’t mean that, alongside many other factors (from the decline in labor unions to increasing automation), globalization—to be precise, capitalist globalization—doesn’t deserve some good share of the blame.

There are two main ways the U.S. working-class is affected by globalization: in terms of jobs and in terms of consumption.

As far as jobs are concerned, the combination of cheap imports (e.g., toys and garments) and outsourcing (e.g., to produce motor vehicles and electronics) has led to the reallocation of workers away from high-wage manufacturing jobs into other sectors and occupations, with large declines in wages among workers who have been forced to have the freedom to switch. Those effects are pretty straightforward, at least in terms of the research of Avraham Ebenstein, Ann Harrison, and Margaret McMillan.*

What about the cheaper goods workers can buy? The argument that is usually invoked to counter the negative effects on jobs and wages is that workers can now purchase less expensive goods (e.g., at big-box and dollar stores), thereby increasing their consumption.

Here’s Dillow:

For one thing, cheap imports should help workers. If you’re spending $5 on a Chinese T-shirt rather than $10 on a US-made one, you’ve got $5 more to spend on other things. That should increase demand and jobs.

That may be true in the short run, since with the same nominal incomes workers can add other items to their consumption bundle.

But what Dillow and others miss is the fact that, as the prices of items in the wage bundle decline (and without an ability to defend the value of their customary standard of living), the value of workers’ labor power also has a tendency to decline. As a result, employers have to pay less to get access to laborers’ ability to work—and their profits rise.

Considering both jobs and consumption, members of the U.S. working-class—many of them voters in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin—correctly understood they were under assault by the forces of globalization.

The fact that U.S. workers have, in recent decades, been negatively affected by globalization doesn’t mean either adopting a nationalist stance or ignoring all the other factors. Nationalism (e.g., in terms of erecting protectionist barriers to trade) just pits workers in one country against those in other countries and doesn’t, within any country including the United States, solve the problem of workers getting the short end of the economic stick. And, certainly, we need to look at all the causes of workers’ current plight, from deteriorating real minimum wages to skill- and power-biased technological change.

However, globalization as it is currently configured has been one of the strategies employers have been able to use to discipline and punish workers, increasing both inequality and insecurity.

Globalization is therefore at least in part to blame for Trump’s victory.


*Even those who, like Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Tyler Moran, want to argue that, through the “prosperity effect,” globalization has made a positive contribution to average wages, are forced to admit that “Richer households did enjoy a disproportionate share of benefits from globalization, because of their dominant claim on corporate profits and proprietors’ incomes and the very small impact of foreign competition on the wages of highly skilled workers.”


I understand readers’ attention is mostly focused on today’s election. However, it is not too soon to look beyond the results themselves, to consider the economic policies of the new administration. If Hillary Clinton is elected (as seems likely), reducing “labor market monopsony” appears to be one of the directions economic policy will be going.


For decades now, the labor share of U.S. national income (the blue line measured on the left-hand vertical axis in the chart above) has steadily declined, while the shares of income and wealth captured by the top 1 percent (the red and green lines on the right-hand axis) has increased. And in recent years, even as employment has mostly recovered from the Second Great Depression, the wages paid to the majority of workers have continued to stagnate (even while incomes of workers at the very top, especially CEOs and other corporate executives, have risen).

Might it be the case that employers are conspiring to keep workers’ wages down?

The idea that employers often try and ultimately succeed in keeping workers’ wages lower than they otherwise would be has been recognized seen at least the end of the eighteenth century—an observation made by none other than Adam Smith:

What are the common wages of labour, depends every where upon the contract usually made between those two parties, whose interests are by no means the same. The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible. The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order to lower the wages of labour.

It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily; and the law, besides, authorises, or at least does not prohibit their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen. We have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against combining to raise it. In all such disputes the masters can hold out much longer. . .

We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and every where in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is every where a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and one may say, the natural state of things which nobody ever hears of. Masters too sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this rate. These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of execution, and when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do, without resistance, though severely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people.

However, it wasn’t until 1932 that we got the modern term for exercising market power on the purchasing or demand side of a market: monopsony. It should come as no surprise that it was invented by Joan Robinson (with help from classicist B. L. Hallward) and first utilized in her Economics of Imperfect Competition.

It is necessary to find a name for the individual buyer which will correspond to the name monopolist for the individual seller. In the following pages an individual buyer is referred to as a monopsonist.

Still, within mainstream economics, the idea that employers would operate as monopsonists—and therefore exercise power in setting workers’ wages—was mostly considered irrelevant, either overlooked or considered to be a minor exception (as, e.g., in the stereotypical “company town”) to the rule of perfectly competitive markets.

Now, however, that seems to have changed. The combination of slow wage growth, obscene and still-increasing inequality, and growing concentration among corporations in the production and selling of commodities (the classical case of monopoly) has put monopsony back on the agenda—at least for the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (pdf).


Monopsony in the labor market serves an important explanatory role for Jason Furman and the other members of the Council because it creates a situation in which both wages (W2) and employment (Q2) are lower than they would be in perfect competition (W1 and Q1, respectively). In consequence, as a result of the shifting of the balance of bargaining toward employers, the wage share declines and both employers’ profits and the incomes of high-level corporate employees increase.*

What this means, in terms of policy, is a series of reforms designed to move markets closer to mainstream economists’ ideal of perfect competition: anti-trust enforcement as well reforms to labor markets (such as modernizing non-compete clauses, pay transparency, and affordable health care) that enhance the ability of workers to move between employers and move closer to “normal” wages.

The problem, of course, is that the theory of labor market monopsony, which pertains to individual employers, also serves to obscure the power wielded by employers as a class. When, as the result of a complex historical process, the labor market itself is created, a large group of people is forced to have the freedom to sell their ability to work to a small group of employers, who own or have access to the financial resources to hire those workers. Under such conditions (as they are first created and then reproduced over time), even if individual employers exercise no market power at all (and take the wage as given by the market), workers’ wages are still only equal to the value of their labor power, which is less than the value workers create. Workers are, in other words, exploited—even in the absence of individual monopsony.

What monopsony does, initially, is lower the wage to a level below the value of labor power (thus making it difficult for workers to continue to sell their ability to work under customary conditions). Then, if such a condition persists, the value of labor power itself falls (as the value of the basket of goods that make up the workers’ customary standard of living declines), thus increasing the level of exploitation. That, of course, is exactly what has happened in the United States since the mid-1970s.

Enforcing anti-trust laws and reforming the labor market might lower the amount of individual employers’ power in the labor market, thus raising the price (and, perhaps eventually, the value) of labor power. But it would not eliminate the monopsony of the group of employers as a whole in relation to the working-class.

The only way to abolish that class monopsony and build a more equitable economy is to eliminate the central role and regulating principle of the labor market—by creating the conditions whereby workers are not excluded from participating in the appropriation of their surplus labor.


*It is also the case that, if there is significant monopsony in the labor market, an increase in the minimum wage (at least up to W1) will actually lead to an increase in employment (toward Q1).


The latest—and, in terms of the presidential campaign, last—jobs report was generally greeted with cheers.

Here’s a representative example, from FiveThirtyEight’s Ben Casselman:

It may be too late to affect Tuesday’s election, but the economy is finally delivering real wage growth to American workers.

The average U.S. employee earned $25.92 an hour in October, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported Friday. That’s up 2.8 percent from a year earlier, the fastest growth since 2009. Non-managers — what the BLS calls “production and non-supervisory employees” — saw their earnings rise a more modest 2.4 percent, but they too are seeing gains that are running well ahead of inflation.

That may be true. But what Casselman and others fail to mention is that, since 2009 (and therefore the beginning of the current “recovery”) the growth in corporate profits has far outpaced the growth in wages. As of the end of the second quarter of 2016, the profits realized by the nation’s corporations had increased by about 60 percent while hourly wages had risen only 15.6 percent.

In other words, even with the recent declines in the rate of unemployment (and the subsequent upward pressure on workers’ wages), the so-called recovery has been much better for corporations and their bottom-line than it has been for workers and their ability to feed their families.

No wonder, then, that there’s a lack of enthusiasm on the part of U.S. workers for either candidate in this year’s presidential election.


Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump argue on the campaign trail that manufacturing is a source of good-paying jobs and the United States needs to do all it can to strengthen that sector.*

What both candidates ignored is the fact that the manufacturing now pays (and has since 2006 paid) lower wages than the average for the private sector as a whole (as readers can see in the chart above). In September, the average hourly wage for a nonsupervisory worker in manufacturing was $20.59, more than a dollar an hour less than for other workers in the private sector.

Employers may complain about a “talent shortage,” about not being able to find enough skilled workers to fill jobs, but they’re not willing to pay higher wages to attract those workers. The problem is, most factory jobs have been redefined as lower-level work.


According to a recent report from the University of California-Berkeley Center for Labor Research and Education (pdf), a large number (34 percent) of the families of frontline manufacturing production workers are enrolled in one or more public safety net programs.

The high utilization of public safety net programs by frontline manufacturing production workers is primarily a result of low wages, rather than inadequate work hours. e families of 32 percent of all manufacturing production workers and 46 percent of those employed through staffing agencies who worked at least 35 hours a week and 45 weeks during the year were enrolled in one or more public safety net program.

Thus, between 2009 and 2013, the federal government and the states spent more than $10.2 billion per year on public safety-net programs for workers (and their families) who hold frontline manufacturing production jobs. (This includes workers directly hired by manufacturers and those hired through staffing agencies.)

As I have explained before, I hold no particular nostalgia for industry in the hinterlands of the U.S. economy.

Nor do American workers. They may be angry about their current plight but neither the current presidential candidates nor employers are willing to do what is necessary to create decent, well-paying jobs for the millions of people who have been laid off or who are currently forced to sell their ability to work to obtain precarious jobs at substandard wages.

Calls to restore the manufacturing sector to its former glory may do something for employers but they offer little in the way of real solutions to American workers.


*And Trump (but not Clinton) is criticized for ignoring the fact that the “nation’s manufacturing sector is actually booming.”


Special mention

huck2nov 186721_600